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RICO-EcoNoMIc MOTIVE UNNECESSARY FOR THE PROOF OF AN
ENTERPRISE. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. V. SCHEIDLER,
114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
INTRODUCTION
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidlerl pitted
familiar foes against one another when the National Organization
for Women (NOW), a pro-choice women's rights organization, and
two health clinics joined forces to combat antiabortion protesters.
The controversy between the two factions, however, did not take
place on a sidewalk outside a health clinic or on some broadcast
debate. The "pro-choicers" took the "pro-lifers" all the way to the
Supreme Court in a battle which did not directly address women's
freedom of privacy or a baby's right to live. The debate addressed
whether antiabortion protesters can be prosecuted under a federal
organized crime statute when they stray from the lawful path down
the path of civil disobedience. 2
In Scheidler, NOW claimed the antiabortion protesters violated
a federal organized crime statute, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization (RICO)' Chapter of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970 (OCCA).4 However, protesters generally do not
1. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
2. See Charles R. DiSalvo, Abortion and Consensus: The Futility of Speech,
The Power of Disobedience, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 219 (1991), for a compre-
hensive philosophical discussion of the proper exercise of civil disobedience. DiSalvo
examines the actions and results of successful civil rights activists as support for
his theories regarding how to effectively utilize civil disobedience to inspire change.
Id. at 220-22. He also points out the defects in the tactics of one radical pro-life
group, Operation Rescue. Id. at 222-34.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In Parnes v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1982), Judge Shadur offered
a possible explanation for the creation of the "awkward title" of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, more commonly known as RICO. The
judge, in a footnote, suggested the one who coined the title was a "movie buff
with a sense of humor" because Hollywood's first cinema attraction about gangsters
was "Little Caesar," a 1930's movie with a lead character named "Rico." G.
Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg" 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 237 n.3 (1982) (citing Parnes, 548 F. Supp.
at 21 n.l.).
It is worth noting that Professor Blakey played a role in the drafting of the
original RICO statute. He served as "the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate in 1969-1970." Id.
at 237 n.l.
4. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 801 (1994).
The opening language closely resembles opening salvos from other RICO cases
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possess a financial motive, which many courts have held to be a
RICO requirement. Thus, the Supreme Court answered the question
whether conviction under RICO can be achieved absent an economic
motive. 5 The Court, after employing a strict plain language assessment
of the statute, held that no requirement of an edonomic motive
existed within RICO's language. 6
This Note will first attempt to simplify the complexity of RICO
by generally discussing Section 1962 to give the reader a foundation
upon which to examine the import of the Scheidler decision. Second,
the Note will summarize the facts giving rise to the case and discuss
its progress through the federal courts. Then, the Note will describe
the origin of RICO and its subsequent judicial treatment-noting
especially the courts' treatment of RICO's enterprise element-to
demonstrate how the law of RICO has evolved in its interpretation
and application. Finally, after a thorough explanation of the rea-
soning of the Court's central holding,' the Note will discuss the
significance of this case in the Eighth Circuit specifically;" the Note
decided by the Court, as Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Court was addressing
RICO's interpretation "once again." See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct.
1163, 1166 (1993); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 17 (1983). Perhaps that
recurring language suggests a Court that is tired of sounding the bell for the broad
interpretation of a very broad law. However, consider infra notes 160-71 (discussing
the Reves Court's narrowing RICO's application) and notes 150-55 (explaining how
this breadth could lead to the death knell of RICO) and accompanying text.
5. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 801. Only the 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) count of the
complaint was dismissed by the lower courts on the basis that the respondents
lacked an economic motive. Id. However, the Supreme Court addressed the entire
RICO statute in its decision that no profit-seeking motive is required. Id. at 802.
6. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806.
7. Id. "We hold only that RICO contains no economic motive requirement."
Id.
8. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Eighth Circuit)
approaches RICO's expansiveness reticently. it has repeatedly found, within RICO's
language, elements that the Supreme Court has held to be improper. See infra
notes 88-91 and accompanying text for Eighth Circuit cases narrowly construing
RICO. But see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1173 (1993) (affirming
the Eighth Circuit's operation or management test). This will be discussed more
fully infra at notes 107, 160-71 and in the accompanying text.
The case which provided the initial remark that RICO required an economic
motive in its enterprise element was United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). Although this remark was essentially
dicta because the case involved financially motivated defendants, the Anderson
definition of RICO was adopted by subsequent decisions of other circuits. See,
e.g., United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 940 (1986); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1983). See
also infra note 88 for the Anderson definition of enterprise. In fact, this definition
became the basis of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's
(Seventh Circuit) decision to uphold the dismissal of the RICO counts in Scheidler.
[Vol. 17:343
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will also address the possible affects of Scheidler on the treatment
of RICO generally in all the federal courts, as well as the possible
constitutional challenges which may develop following this and other
recent RICO Supreme Court decisions.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO RICO
Congress created RICO to respond to the ever-increasing problem
of organized crime, or racketeering, occurring in the marketplace
of the American economy. 9 Prior to RICO's creation, law enforce-
ment had few weapons in its arsenal to stop the growth of organized
crime.' 0 Congress therefore created RICO with extreme breadth to
enable law enforcement agencies to reach and impact evasive and
powerful racketeers."
RICO provides both criminal and civil remedies and allows the
federal government to instigate both kinds of proceedings., 2 Private
plaintiffs may also initiate civil proceedings against racketeers to
recover treble damages and costs incurred. 3 Although this discussion
emphasizes the civil RICO process, the process involved in Scheidler,14
it should be recognized that the decision impacts both civil and
criminal applications of RICO because the enterprise element is the
same for both.
Private use of this powerful statutory weapon has grown tre-
mendously since its inception due to the lure of treble damages and
expenses.' 5 A plaintiff' 6 need only demonstrate, by a preponderance
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). For this reason, it is possible that the Anderson
definition has been called into question by the Scheidler decision. See infra notes
157-58 (citing a district court case holding that Scheidler did call Anderson's
enterprise definition into question).
For these reasons this casenote will emphasize possibilities for the Eighth
Circuit's future interpretation of RICO law.
9. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(1970). See infra note 79 for the complete text of the preface to the Organized
Crime Control Act of which RICO is one part.
10. See infra note 79.
11. See infra note 79.
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(b), 1964(b) (1988).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
14. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1963 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. Marguerite C. Gualtieri, Note, 35 VILL. L. REv. 705, 707 (1990). It has
been posited that the "attraction of treble damages and attorney's fees has trans-
formed civil RICO into 'the darling of the prosecutor's nursery.' " Id. (quoting
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1011 (1980) (quoting
1994]
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of the evidence," that the defendant injured the plaintiff's business
or property in one of the following four ways: (1) investing income
received through racketeering activity in the establishment or op-
eration of an enterprise;"8 (2) acquiring or maintaining interest or
control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; 19
(3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity; 20 or, (4) conspiring to do any of the first three. 2'
Two elements are common to all four offenses. A plaintiff must
show: (1) the existence of an enterprise; and, (2) a pattern of
racketeering activity. The statute intentionally imparts breadth to
these terms. 22 The statute purports to define the terms, but leaves
the definitions open-ended. For example, an enterprise can even
include an entity associated only in fact.2a Likewise, the statute
defines a "pattern of racketeering activity" as requiring, at a min-
imum, two predicate acts committed within ten years of each other. 24
In addition, these terms are subject to RICO's liberal construction
clause.25 Neither definition provides a concise meaning of either
Judge Learned Hand's comment with regard to the crime of conspiracy in Harrison
v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925))).
16. RICO plaintiffs have included "individuals, American and foreign corpo-
rations, partnerships, governmental units and agencies, labor unions, churches,
universities, estates, and foreign governments." DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF
CIVIL RICO § 1.3.1 (1991). The class of potential plaintiffs is extremely broad, as
"person" is defined by RICO as "includ[ing] any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3)
(1988)).
17. Of course, a criminal RICO conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988).
22. See infra note 79 (containing the "Statement of Findings and Purpose" of
OCCA).
23. " '[E]nterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
24. " '[P]attern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [October
15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period
of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
As with any action, one must also consider the statute of limitations. The
applicable statute of limitations requires a plaintiff to bring an action within five
years of the last predicate act committed. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988).
25. RICO is to "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947
(1970),
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term; rather the statutory definitions give a framework within which
the terms exist.2 6 As a result, federal courts have debated the meanings
of these terms for years. Courts have interposed various requirements
in an effort to determine what constitutes an enterprise or a pattern
and what must be proven to demonstrate these two elements.
Generally, the Supreme Court has stated that a RICO enterprise
must have a common purpose, continuity of structure, continuity
of personnel, and be distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity
alleged. 27 The Supreme Court, prior to Scheidler, gave no further
guidance regarding the definition of enterprise itself. Common pur-
pose and continuity generally exist in legal entities and are basically
meant to be self-defined concepts. 2  However, "association-in-fact
enterprises" present potential difficulties in proving the existence of
an enterprise because the formalities of these structures are more
elusive.29 Scheidler addresses specifically the nature of the enterprise
element in Section 1962(c) and, more narrowly, the common purpose
requirement of an enterprise. 30
The second concept lacking a true definition, a pattern of
racketeering, 3' cannot be understood without understanding what
constitutes racketeering activity. Section 1961(1) defines "racketeering
26. See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE
L.J. 1561, 1590 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES
(1993)) [hereinafter Cunningham] (discussing specifically the enterprise element's
definition).
27. U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). But see ABRAMS, supra note
16, § 4.3.2, at 197-202 (discussing why Turkette did not specifically require a
distinction between the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity require-
ments).
28. "The enterprise is an entity . . . a group of persons associated together for
a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct ... [and] is proved by
evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the
various associates function as a continuing unit." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
29. ABRAMS, supra note 16, § 4.3.2. Association-in-fact enterprises do not need
to be legal entities. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). A great deal of litigation and
confusion surround the application of RICO to these enterprises because they can
be any group of persons as defined in the RICO statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3)
(1988). Any two people, as broadly defined by RICO, associated with a purpose
that would violate § 1962, are a RICO enterprise.
30. Section 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
31. Professor Solan termed both "enterprise" and "pattern" as "concepts with
fuzzy boundaries." Cunningham, supra note 26, at 1585.
19941
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activity" by listing a number of specific federal and state crimes
which, if broken, are the predicate acts necessary to show racketeering
and a pattern of racketeering.12
The Supreme Court gave some boundaries to the pattern of
racketeering activity requirement in 1988.13 The Court held the pattern
requirement could be proven by demonstrating two additional con-
cepts: relatedness and continuity of activity. 4 There must be some
order or similar purpose behind the goals of the predicate acts to
demonstrate a relationship, or relatedness." Continuity requires dem-
onstrating either continuous illegal acts within a closed time period
or the threat of continuing illegal conduct into the future.3 6
Although RICO appears simply stated, it is very complex. Im-
posing liability under RICO basically requires a showing of an
enterprise, conduct constituting a pattern of racketeering activity,
and an impact on interstate commerce. However, understanding those
terms can escape the most accomplished of commentators, as is
evidenced by the number of cases diametrically decided.37
II. FACTS
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler was argued
before the Court on December 8, 1993, and the Court gave its
opinion on January 24, 1994.38 The Court, with Chief Justice Rehn-
quist writing, held unanimously that the Racketeer Influenced Cor-
rupt Organizations Act39 did not require the proof or pleading that
the defendant possessed an economic motive.4 Justice Souter wrote
a concurring opinion which Justice Kennedy joined. 4'
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The specific laws range from
mail fraud and bribery to drug running and murder. Id.; see also infra notes 54-
55 (discussing § 1961(1)).
33. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
34. Id. at 239.
35. Id. at 240.
36. Id. at 241-42. Justice Scalia opened the door to void-for-vagueness challenges
to this definition in his concurrence which is discussed further infra notes 151-52,
155 and accompanying text. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring).
37. An example of Supreme Court Justices interpreting RICO entirely differently,
but citing the clarity of their respective positions, can be found in Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Lawrence Solan commented on this 5-4 decision
in his book, The Language of Judges. See Cunningham, supra note 26, at 1582-
85.
38. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
40. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 801.
41. Id. at 806 (Souter, J., concurring). Justices Souter and Kennedy addressed
specifically the arguments of the respondents and amici who were concerned about
[Vol. 17:343
The petitioners in this case were the National Organization for
Women, Inc., 42 Delaware Women's Health Organization (DWHO),
and Summit Women's Health Organization (SWHO). 43 The respon-
dents were a combination of pro-life activists including Joseph Schei-
dler.44
NOW, DWHO, and SWHO filed the original complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.5
The trial court, with Judge Holderman presiding, 46 granted the res-
pondents' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint.4 7 On appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Seventh
Circuit), Chief Judge Bauer wrote a decision that affirmed, with
reservations, the district court's dismissal. 48
The second amended complaint 49 alleged violations of both the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a), (c), and (d) 50 and the Sherman Antitrust Act,5' as well
the ramifications of a RICO interpreted without an economic motive requirement
in light of First Amendment freedoms. Id. For more discussion of their concurrence,
see infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
42. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 801. "NOW is a national nonprofit organization"
that champions women's rights such as the "availability of abortion." Id.
43. Id. Both DWHO and SWHO are health centers that provide health services
including abortions. Id.
44. Id. The coalition of antiabortion groups called themselves the Pro-Life
Action Network (PLAN). Id. Other respondents included in the complaint were:
John Patrick Ryan, Randall A. Terry, Andrew Scholberg, Conrad Wojnar, Timothy
Murphy, Monica Migliorino, Vital-Med Laboratories, Inc., Pro-Life Action League,
Inc. (PLAL), Pro-Life Direct Action League, Inc. (PDAL), Operation Rescue, and
Project Life. Id. n.l. Vital-Med was a medical laboratory that had furnished the
two petitioner health organizations with its services. Id. This relationship ended
when one or more of Vital-Med's employees helped certain of the other defendants
obtain approximately 4,000 aborted fetuses from the laboratory to use in the groups'
protests of abortion, and to hold burial services for the fetuses. National Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
798 (1994); see also infra note 57 (presenting one of the respondent's purported
purpose for committing the illegal actions).
45. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Ill.
1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
46. Id. at 938.
47. Id. at 945.
48. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 614.
49. The original complaint was twice amended in response to motions by the
defendants. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 938-39. The second amended complaint was
the subject reviewed by all three levels of the federal courts. National Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 800 (1994); Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 614;
Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 945.
50. The relevant portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) states:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ...
19941 RICO 349
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as many supplemental state claims.5 2 The petitioners specifically al-
leged that the respondents were guilty of repeated violent demon-
strations which involved trespass, destruction of property, and the
theft of medical supplies." In addition to these allegations, the
petitioners contended the antiabortion activists committed Hobbs Act
extortion . 4 The Hobbs Act violations constituted the predicate acts
necessary to satisfy the pattern of racketeering requirement of RICO."
The defendants argued they were not chargeable under RICO
because their alleged enterprise had no financial motive.5 6 They
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or [its]
proceeds . . . in acquisition of any interest in, or [to] affect ... commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). The count charging the respondents with this offense
was dismissed because the petitioners did not plead what the trial court considered
to be "income" as required by the statute. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 941. Petitioners
stated that the pro-life networks took donations to support their alleged racketeering
activities. Id. These donations, the petitioners further asserted, were invested to
perpetuate the protestors' unlawful acts. Id. The Supreme Court only reviewed the
holding that RICO requires an economic motive. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 800.
For the complete text of § 1962(c), see supra note 30.
The count alleging a violation of § 1962(d), or conspiracy to act as a racketeer,
was dismissed because all other RICO counts had been dismissed. Scheidler, 765
F. Supp. at 944-45 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
52. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 614.
53. Id. at 615.
54. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 800. The Hobbs Act violations alleged were essential
to the petitioners' RICO claims. The Hobbs Act is one of the specific federal laws
enumerated as a predicate act to a RICO violation in § 1961(l)'s definition of
"racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). The Hobbs Act can be found
at 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
The petitioners' brief stated that the defendants were attempting to "drive all
clinics performing abortions out of business 'by any and all means available.' "
Brief for Petitioners at 4, National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
798 (1994) available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 459617 [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief].
The means allegedly included "extortion through direct threats of personal harm
to clinic personnel and patients; arson and fire-bombing; burglary and criminal
damage to clinic property .... " Id. The alleged extortion constituted the claim
of Hobbs Act violations.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). Section 1961(1) gives a lengthy, but not exclusive,
list of the possible predicate acts required to find a "pattern of racketeering activity."
Id. The definition includes any act or threat "chargeable" under a variety of state
laws such as murder, gambling, and arson, or any act "indictable" under certain
federal laws such as the Hobbs Act. Id.
NOW claimed the respondents used Hobbs Act extortion to injure the property
rights of the clinics and their patients. Petitioners' Brief, supra note 54, at 10.
56. Some other defenses the pro-life defendants proffered specifically answered
many of the petitioners' charges: that the defendants were not involved in violent
protesting, that their expression was non-violent in nature, and that their actions
were protected by the First Amendment. Brief for Respondents Joseph M. Scheidler
et al. at 1-7, National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994),
available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 459767 [hereinafter Respondents' Brief].
[Vol. 17:343
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claimed they were simply protesting abortion as the killing of human
life.17 Thus, the defendants moved for dismissal for failure to state
a claim58 and further asserted that their actions were constitutionally
protected speech 9
The district court found the absence of an economic motive
decisive in its dismissal of the RICO counts ° The circuit court
concurred reluctantly, 6  finding that the lack of a profit-minded
57. The brief for Monica Migliorino depicted the alleged theft of the aborted
fetuses as follows:
[Tihe funeral masses and ceremonies were performed as an act of religious
worship and faith: "Insofar as ... Migliorino ... participated in the
handling, funeral rites, [and] burial of the unborn victims of abortion,
she did so motivated by her religious belief . . . believing that such [acts]
were an act of charity and a work of mercy, affording such unborn victims
a measure of recognition of individual worth and human dignity."
Brief for Respondent Monica Migliorino at 5-6, National Org. for Women, Inc.
v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994), available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 459805.
Such a faith in the life and liberty of unborn fetuses shows passionate expression,
which if not violent, arguably should be protected regardless of what one believes
about the positive good of the freedom of choice. See infra notes 172-75 and
accompanying text for a comparison of the antiabortion movement with such
movements as the sixties' civil rights movement.
58. The respondents successfully moved according to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure at the trial court level. Thus, the court dismissed all
federal counts. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937,
945 (N.D. II. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798
(1994). The counts under state law were subsequently dismissed because the court
no longer had pendent jurisdiction. Id.
59. See supra notes 56-57. The Supreme Court has frequently found that certain
kinds of conduct can be protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (holding a St. Paul ordinance that prohibited
bias-motivated disorderly conduct unconstitutional under the First Amendment);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (reversing a conviction under a Texas statute
making it unlawful to desecrate the United States flag because the statute violated
the First Amendment); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
(overturning a Mississippi state court decision against the NAACP and certain of
its members for injuries to all-white businesses caused by a NAACP sponsored
economic boycott because the judgment punished individuals for their membership
in the NAACP); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (reversing
a conviction under an ordinance forbidding parades and public demonstrations
without first obtaining a permit).
60. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 943. The court based its opinion on the Seventh
Circuit's decision in United States v. Neapolitan, which adopted the Eighth Circuit's
definition of a RICO enterprise. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986) (adopting the definition of
enterprise as outlined by United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)). The Anderson Court found the term
enterprise, by definition, implied a profit-seeking motive, especially in light of the
use of the term in subsections (a) and (b) of § 1962. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1366.
See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text discussing the possibility that Scheidler
has called this definition into question.
61. The court stated that its reluctance stemmed from the "reprehensible" nature
19941
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motive compelled affirmation of the district court's ruling. 62 In its
opinion, the Seventh Circuit surveyed the precedents established by
the Eighth Circuit, 63 as well as the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) 64 and the Third Circuit (Third
Circuit). 65 The appellate court noted that it previously had adopted
the Eighth Circuit's definition of enterprise in one of its earlier
RICO decisions." However, neither circuit's cases had ever directly
addressed the issue of economic motive; therefore, the court focused
on the opinions of the Second 6 and Third" Circuits that did directly
confront the issue of a RICO profit-making motive requirement. 69
of the respondents' acts. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d
612, 630 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). It is true that the alleged
acts would be reprehensible if committed; however, it is interesting that the circuit
court conceded that its reluctance to affirm was based upon acts which had yet
to be proven. Id.
62. Id. at 614.
63. United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming a RICO
count against a labor union local manager noting that the defendant obviously had
economic motivation), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988); United States v. Anderson,
626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980) (reversing a RICO conviction against two Arkansas
county judges because the alleged enterprise could not be said to have a structure
or goal distinct from the charged pattern of racketeering activity), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 912 (1981).
64. United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming trial
court's RICO conviction because defendants had "some" profit-seeking purpose),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983) (distinguishing the Ivic holding by finding that "some financial purpose" is
what RICO requires), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983); United States v. Ivic, 700
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983) (overturning a RICO conviction against a Croatian Nationalist
terrorist because he lacked financial motivation).
65. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989)
(upholding a RICO judgment against antiabortion activists because RICO did not
require a profit-seeking motive), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
66. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 943; see supra note 60.
67. United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
840 (1983); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit
also mentioned United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1985), which
National Organization for Women argued was invalid authority because the Supreme
Court had overruled the Ferguson holding regarding prior conviction and separate
"racketeering injury" requirements. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479 (1985). Because the Supreme Court did not address the economic motive
requirement in Sedima when it overruled the other parts of Ferguson's holding,
the appellate court still found the precedent of Ferguson persuasive. National Org.
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 627-29 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 798 (1994).
68. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1342.
69. Id. at 1348-49 (finding that the court was not free to read additional
limitations into RICO's express provisions). The Third Circuit cited Sedima, 473
U.S. at 499-500, which stated: "[Tlhis defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the
statute as written and its correction must lie with Congress." In Sedima, that
language followed the Court's acknowledgment that civil RICO was capable of
applications "far beyond those originally intended." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499-500.
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After a lengthy discourse on the persuasiveness of the two
applicable Second Circuit cases,70 the court held that RICO's terms,
its legislative history, and the pertinent administrative directives sup-
ported the implication of an economic motive requirement for RICO
enterprises. 7' In dismissing the holding of the Third Circuit, 72 the
court found the economic motive requirement would not excessively
limit RICO actions, nor would it clearly contradict the directive of
the statutory terms. 73
As a result of the discrepancy in appellate holdings, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
74
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RICO
The Ninety-first Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 7 1 The bill progressed from
the Senate with criminal and civil remedies; however, the original
Senate bill 76 only provided injunctive relief for civil RICO plaintiffs.
The House added significant bite to the bill by attaching a treble-
damages remedy. 77 The Senate concurred in this addition, and the
bill became law.71
70. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 42; Ivic, 700 F.2d at 51. The district court followed
the Bagaric finding that there must be "some financial motive" behind the en-
terprise's motivation. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 942 (citing United States v. Fer-
guson, 758 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir. 1985); Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 55; Ivic, 700 F.2d
at 65). The court also noted that the economic motive need not be the overriding
motive. Id.
71. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 627-28.
72. Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
73. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 629-30.
74. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993). The
grant of certiorari was a grant in part to decide whether an economic motive was
required for the pleading and proof of a RICO enterprise. National Org. for
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 800 (1994).
75. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(1970). This law had no common law origin and was created to battle the modern
phenomenon of sophisticated organized crime. The only law that could be considered
a predecessor would be the antitrust legislation because Congress patterned its
structure in formulating RICO's treble-damages provision. See Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489-90 n.8 (1985).
76. S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Senator John McClellan of Arkansas
introduced the first racketeering bill into the Senate. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
115 CONG. REc. 769 (1969).
77. This addition came at the final stages of the law's enactment and was
passed very quickly. It has been suggested that this last minute addition to the
relief available is the reason civil RICO has produced so much litigation and has
19941
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The purpose of RICO is generally summarized in the preface
to OCCA. 9 The lawmakers determined that organized crime was
not effectively remedied by the traditional criminal justice tools
available to law enforcement entities. 80 Thus, they hoped to forge
a more sophisticated sword for those agencies to wield against
organized crime.8' Congress observed that organized crime was sap-
ping the economy of the United States by absorbing billions of
dollars into the criminal world.12 OCCA, including RICO, was the
resulting weapon created to combat organized crime.
reached defendants not contemplated by the legislators who passed the bill into
law. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CivIL Rico: A DEFINITIVE GUDE 3 (1992).
78. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(1970). RICO was Title IX of OCCA. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988); Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970).
79. The preface to OCCA, entitled "Statement of Findings and Purpose,"
provides:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a
highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually
drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct
and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime
derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such
illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and
fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and
other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic
processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the
stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and
competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden
interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and un-
dermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process
of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on
...... ,nl... activi:t.isof th,ose engagd in organized crime and because
the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily
limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
(1970).
80. "[O]rganized crime continues to grow because of defects in the . . . [legal]
process [and the] ... remedies available . . . ." Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
81. "It is the purpose of [OCCA, and therefore, RICO] . . .to . . .eradicat[e]
... organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools ......
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970).
82. "The Congress finds that ... organized crime ... drains billions of
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Prior to 1980, civil RICO prosecutions occurred infrequently.
At that time, corresponding with the decade some have referred to
as the "decade of greed," 8 the amount of civil RICO claims mush-
roomed.84 As the claims became more and more profuse, the federal
trial and appellate courts judicially narrowed RICO's seemingly broad
scope. Courts feared RICO's application against defendants whom
the general public would not consider mobsters.85 Still, more legit-
imate businesses 86 and even protest groups87 were being charged with
RICO counts.
RICO's offenses and elements of the offenses can confuse the
most proficient lawyer. The Section 1962(c) offense has been the
subject of many interpretational debates before the judiciary.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals frequently restricted RI-
CO's scope in claims made against atypical racketeers. One of the
earliest hints of the Eighth Circuit's narrow view of RICO arose in
1980 in United States v. Anderson.8  The Anderson court found that
a RICO enterprise must have some discernable structure with its
operations focused on an economic goal.89 This was the first case
suggesting that a RICO enterprise must have an economic goal.
In 1987, the Eighth Circuit held that for a plaintiff to prove
the existence of the pattern of racketeering activity element, the
plaintiff must show the existence of more than one illegal scheme. 90
dollars .... Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922, 922 (1970).
83. See Thomas Sowell, Was Adam Smith a Closet Socialist (Both Conservatives
and Liberals Hold Humanitarian Values), FoRBEs, Dec. 20, 1993, at 220.
84. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 n.1 (1985); Gualtieri,
supra note 15, at 707.
85. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d at 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
86. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir.
1987) (affirming district court's dismissal of RICO claims against Northwestern Bell
because the court found that the pattern of racketeering activity element required
the pleading and proof of "multiple schemes"), rev'd, 492 U.S. 229 (1988).
87. See, e.g., Northeast Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d
1342 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding antiabortion protesters guilty under RICO), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
88. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981). The Anderson case did not directly address the economic motive
requirement because the defendant possessed a financial motive. Id. at 1361-62.
Anderson is significant, though, because in defining "enterprise," the court held
that the phrase "a group of individuals associated in fact . . . encompass[ed] only
an association having an ascertainable structure, . . . an economic goal, . . . [and]
an existence apart from the ... pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 1372.
89. Id. at 1372.
90. H.J. Inc., 829 F.2d at 648. The Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff must
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Then, in 1991, the court found that a Section 1962(c) conviction
could only be attained against a defendant who participated in the
operation or management of the enterprise alleged in the statute,
as opposed to simply being a part of the enterprise. 91
All of these holdings represented limitations on the breadth of
RICO's applications. However, in most every case except Reves, the
Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts, including
the Eighth Circuit.92 The Supreme Court has read RICO broadly, 93
its terms unambiguously,94 and has followed the statute's liberal
construction clause emphatically in nearly every case addressing RI-
CO's interpretation.95
prove the existence of multiple schemes to prove the existence of a pattern of
racketeering activity. Id. at 650. A scheme can be understood as the purpose behind
the predicate acts; therefore, under the multiple schemes test, a plaintiff must prove
the existence of more than one fraudulent purpose or effort. Id.
91. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), aff'd sub.
nom. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
92. The Supreme Court has consistently spurned additional RICO requirements
which lower courts have found in legislative history or implicit within the language
of RICO. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1984) (overturning
the two requirements the Second Circuit imposed: prior conviction of predicate
acts and a separate "racketeering injury"); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576 (1981) (overturning First Circuit's holding that a RICO enterprise encompassed
only legitimate enterprises, not illegitimate enterprises). But see Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (affirming the Eighth Circuit's requirement that the
defendant be a part of the operation of management of the enterprise). See also
infra notes 160-71 for comment on this decision which appears inconsistent with
all other Supreme Court decisions regarding RICO's interpretation.
93. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497. "RICO is to be read broadly." Id.
94. Id. at 499. "[The fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."
Id. (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384,
32098 ('/ h Ci r. IMAI)
95. Id. at 498. "RICO is to 'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes.' " Id. (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970)).
Arguably, the Sedima holding may have been dispositive in many of the
subsequent cases addressing RICO limitations, including Scheidler. The Court wrote
in Sedima:
A violation of § 1962(c), the section on which Sedima relies, requires (1)
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity. The plaintiff must, of course, allege each of these elements to
state a claim .... In addition, the plaintiff only has standing if . . . he
has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting
the violation .... But the statute requires no more than this .... This
less restrictive reading is amply supported by our prior cases and the
general principles surrounding this statute. RICO is to be read broadly.
Id. at 496-97 (footnotes omitted).
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IV. REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Scheidler and limited
its review to the narrow issue of whether RICO contains an economic
motive implicit in its enterprise requirement. 96 Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for the unanimous Court which held that there is no economic
motive requirement in the proof of either the racketeering enterprise
or in the predicate acts of racketeering. 97
The Court essentially effected three feats in its decision. First,
the Court's main objective was to resolve the conflict between the
circuits concerning the issue of an economic motive requirement.98
In addition, the Court summarily dismissed two issues of law raised
by the respondents by reiterating previous decisions and applying
them to the facts at hand. 99 Finally, the Court expressly refused to
address three issues, two'0 of which the Court remanded for con-
sideration by the trial court. 0 '
96. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993). The
Court granted a review of this particular issue solely to resolve the conflict between
three circuits. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text for the circuit courts
in conflict over this issue.
97. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 801 (1994).
98. Id. at 802.
99. The Court first addressed the issue of standing raised by the respondents.
Id. The opinion reiterated that only general allegations are required at the pleading
stage. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992)).
The second issue the Court summarily dismissed concerned the rule of lenity.
This rule allows a court to adopt the most lenient possible meaning of a statute
when the act is so unclear that reasonable minds might differ in their interpretation
of the statute. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 926 (6th ed. 1991). The Court stated that
because the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous the rule of lenity
did not apply. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 587-88 (1981)).
100. The Court refused to address two issues which it remanded to the district
court for consideration: (1) the alleged Hobbs Act violations, Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
at 802; and (2) the First Amendment challenges, Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806.
101. The Court also questioned the applicability of administrative guidelines to
the process of statutory interpretation, but did not give a direct response to the
issue because the guidelines to which the respondents and the lower courts cited
had been amended. Id. at 805. However, Justice Rehnquist did intimate the correct
answer by citing to Justice Scalia's concurrence in Crandon v. United States, 494
U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805. This
reference, however, could produce a problematic analysis of either the Scheidler
opinion or Justice Scalia's concurrence in Crandon. On the page in Crandon
immediately following Justice Rehnquist's pinpoint cite to that case, Justice Scalia
specifically addressed advice given by the Department of Justice. Crandon, 494
U.S. at 178. Justice Scalia noted that the Justice Department tends to take a broad
view of all criminal statutes, because to take a narrow view would likely never
result in judicial correction. Id. However, if the Department reads a statute broadly,
perhaps the Justice Department will achieve its goal of easier prosecutions. Id. At
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Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded the Court's opinion by stating
that the Court only held that no financial motive requirement is
embodied in the RICO statute. 0 2 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court followed the plain language'03 of the statute,' °4 dismissed one
interpretational argument the Seventh Circuit presented, 05 and de-
cided, with detailed explanation, that any arguments made in reliance
upon nonstatutory materials, such as legislative history, were not
persuasive.1°6
worst, a federal court will compel the department to narrow an overly broad view.
Id. Justice Scalia then concluded that reliance on the Justice Department's guidelines
would result in a rule of severity, not of lenity. Id. The problem with Justice
Rehnquist's citation of this concurrence is that, in the case of the Justice De-
partment's guidelines regarding RICO, the advice was too narrow, not too broad.
102. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806.
103. The Court began this strict plain language assessment of RICO by selecting
the 1969 edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary as its chosen
lexicon. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
A. Raymond Randolph, Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, asserted that "citing to dictionaries creates an] ...
optical illusion," which imparts a guise of clarity, certainty, or "plainness." A.
Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 71, 72 (1994). This, he said, is fruitless
because lexicographers simply define words with more and more words-an infinite
circle of "meaning." Id. He specifically addressed Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113
S. Ct. 1163 (1993), the last RICO case the Supreme Court decided before Scheidler.
Randolph, supra, at 72. The Reves Court used a dictionary to define "conduct,"
which is part of the language of § 1962(c) (see supra note 30 for the complete
language of § 1962(c)). Randolph, supra, at 72 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young,
113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1976))). In Reves, the Court found the word "conduct" implied an element of
direction because the definition given in Webster's was to "lead, run, manage, or
direct." Randolph, supra, at 72. Based on this definition, the Court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the word means to "carry on." Randolph, supra, at 72.
Judge Randolph noted that the word "run," contained within the definition of
conduct, is defined in the same dictionary as to "carry on." Randolph, supra, at
72. He cited this as an example of how using the dictionary to aid in the interpretation
of statutes is simply pushing back the obstacle of genuine statutory interpretation.
Randolph, supra, at 72.
104. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 803-04. Judge Randolph also questioned whether
the Court truly followed a plain meaning interpretation of the statute in Reves.
Randolph, supra note 103, at 76-77. The Court, in both Reves and Scheidler, even
after deciding that the language was unambiguous and needed no further inter-
pretation, continued its opinion and tested its determination by using a cursory
analysis of the legislative history. The court declared the additional materials
supported its plain meaning assessment. Randolph, supra note 103, at 76-77.
Compare Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1170-72 with Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805-06 (noting
particularly the Court's analysis of the legislative history in spite of the fact that
the language was found to be unambiguous).
105. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
106. Id. at 805-06. Judge.Randolph commented that the Supreme Court appears
[Vol. 17:343
The Court commenced its plain language interpretation of the
statute by utilizing a dictionary's definition 10 7 of the term "affect."' ' 0
After finding that the term was defined in earlier cases as having
a negative impact upon commerce, 1°9 the Court reasoned that it
would be simple to hypothesize a situation"0 in which a RICO
enterprise might easily have a negative impact upon interstate or
foreign commerce without any personal financial motive."'
The Court next noted that the enterprise required by subsections
(a) and (b) constitute different entities than the enterprise found in
Section 1962(c)."12 The 1962(c) enterprise acts as a pawn in the hands
of racketeers through which an unlawful pattern of racketeering is
performed; in contrast, the enterprise elements found in 1962(a) and
(b) are the prizes procured or invested in by illegal means."' Because
the enterprises in the neighboring subsections perform different roles,"f4
the Court dismissed the circuit court's finding that the enterprise
of 1962(c) should be interpreted in the same fashion as the enterprises
of 1962(a) and (b). 1' The Court further determined that even if the
enterprises in all three subsections were similar, still none of them
requires a pecuniary motive. 116
to be returning to the "two-step plain meaning rule" of interpretation, or textualism.
Randolph, supra note 103, at 75-76 (citing the Court's "resurrect[ion]" of Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), in United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235 (1989)). The Court basically followed the "two-step" method in
Scheidler. The two-step method of statutory interpretation requires looking to the
statute's language; if the language is clear, then a court must look no further.
Randolph, supra note 103, at 71 n.l. If the language is ambiguous, then a court
may examine superstatutory materials to attempt to glean Congress's intent. Ran-
dolph, supra note 103, at 71 n.l.
107. It has become fairly common for courts to quote to some dictionary.
Randolph, supra note 103, at 72. Judge Randolph, however, eschews this practice
because it only sidesteps many difficult questions about textual analysis. Randolph,
supra note 103, at 72.
108. The definition provided was "to have a detrimental influence on-used
especially in the phrase affecting commerce." Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804 (citing
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35 (1969)).
109. Id. at 804.
110. Id. The Court did not provide any specific examples. It did, however, state
that "[aln enterprise surely can have a detrimental influence on interstate or foreign
commerce without having its own profit-seeking motives." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. For the complete text of § 1962(c) and a summary of § 1962(a), see
supra notes 30 and 50, respectively.
113. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804. The Court cited to Blakey, supra note 3, at
307-25, in its decision. Professor Blakey employed the terms "prize," "instrument,"
"victim," and "perpetrator" to demonstrate that § 1962 enterprises play four distinct
roles in the four different subsections. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804 n.5.
114. Blakey, supra note 3, at 307-25.
115. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804-05.
116. Id. Although the district and circuit courts dismissed the counts concerning
RICO19941
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After the Court interpreted the statute's plain language, it began
to address the specific arguments raised by all the parties, especially
those which the lower courts found persuasive." 7 The Court refuted
every superstatutory interpretive finding by reiterating that the stat-
utory language of RICO is unambiguous"' and by stating that even
if the plain meaning were in doubt the superstatutory materials could
not support the findings of the lower courts. 1 9
The Court found further support for its decision in the preface
of OCCA, 20 contrary to the findings of the lower courts.'2 ' The
Court reasoned that even a group such as the respondents in Schei-
dler, who had no economic motive and were allegedly acting un-
lawfully by committing Hobbs Act extortion,'22 might still harm the
economy by destroying profitable businesses. 2  Finally, the Court
restated its plain language interpretative theories by asserting that
a preface to a bill is a small soapbox upon which to stand to preach
an economic motive requirement not found or implied in the actual
language of the bill. 24
The Court also compared Turkette 25 with the case under con-
sideration in order to further support its reasoning. 26 As Justice
White 27 noted in Turkette that it would have been simple for
Congress to restrict the application of RICO to legitimate enterprises
by the addition of the single term "legitimate,' ' 2 so could the
legislature have confined the scope of RICO to profit-minded en-
terprises by the addition of similar language to that effect. 29
The Court dismissed any possibility of hope for an implicit
economic motive requirement by noting that reliance on the De-
1962(a) and (b) on the basis that the "income" alleged was not "income" under
the statute, and although only subsection (c) was dismissed on the basis that the
defendants were found to possess no economic motive, the Supreme Court ruled
that thc entire RICO statute contains no tacit requirement of a profit-seeking
motive. Id.
117. Id. at 804-06.
118. Id. at 806.
119. The Court found every nontextual argument unpersuasive. Id. at 805.
120. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
922-23 (1970).
121. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805; see supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the decisions of the lower courts).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (1988).
123. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
126. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805.
127. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 577.
128. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 805 (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581).
129. Id.
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partment of Justice's 1981 guidelines for prosecution of RICO cases'30
was unfounded, if for no other reason than because the guidelines
were amended in 1984.' 3' In concluding its resolution of the issue,
the Court again declared that because the written statute is un-
ambiguous, any reliance on legislative history was in error unless it
could be found that the legislative history contained obvious ex-
pressions of a congressional intent to include a profit-seeking motive
within the ambit of the RICO statute.'3 2 Having found no intent to
that effect, the Court dismissed the parties' arguments addressing
the legislative history.'
Finally, after summarily dismissing the issue of the applicability
of the rule of lenity,'3 4 and expressly choosing not to address the
amici's arguments of a "chilling effect,""' the Court restated its
sole holding and found that the petitioners could succeed in their
action on remand by proving that the respondents committed a
pattern of racketeering activity via a RICO enterprise.3 6
Justice Souter added a concurring opinion in which Justice
Kennedy joined.3 7 Justice Souter briefly discussed the reasons for
not reading an economic motive requirement into the statute, even
in light of First Amendment liberties.3 8 In addition, Justice Souter
used his concurrence to emphasize that the Court's holding would
not hinder parties to RICO cases from raising First Amendment
challenges.? 9
130. The 1981 guidelines directed that a prosecutor should not "charge an
association as an enterprise, unless the association exists 'for the purpose of
maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal .... .' " Id. at 805.
131. Id. at 805. The 1984 guidelines simply added, "or some other identifiable
goal." Id. (quoting the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-110.360 (Mar. 9, 1984)).
132. Id. at 806 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993)). The
Court emphasized how concrete this rule had become by showing that Reves cited
to Turkette, which quoted Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
133. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806.
134. Id.
135. Id. The chilling effect doctrine "[in constitutional law [addresses] any law
or practice which has the effect of seriously discouraging the exercise of a con-
stitutional right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 240 (6th ed. 1990) (citing North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)); see also infra notes 153-55 and accompanying
text (discussing footnote 6 of the Scheidler opinion).
136. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806. The opinion stated that the First Amendment
issue was not before the Court. Id. at 806 n.6.
137. Id. at 806-07 (Souter, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 806.
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The finding that the RICO language is unambiguous explained
the Court's refusal to infer an economic motive requirement to avert
First Amendment difficulties, according to Justice Souter.140 How-
ever, Justice Souter remarked that, even if the language were am-
biguous, the financial motive requirement, if added, would be both
an overinclusive and underinclusive means of controlling First
Amendment concerns.' 4' Justice Souter asserted that such a require-
ment would constrain RICO from reaching dogmatic groups that
used violence in expressing their beliefs, even though the law ought
not fear chilling violent expressions. 42 Also, even with a financial
motive requirement, RICO could still reach some expressive protesters
who were acting within the scope of the First Amendment, yet sought
profits to maintain the organization. 43
Justice Souter concluded by advising lawyers that a First Amend-
ment challenge can always be raised as a defense, and by encouraging
the courts that try RICO cases to remember the First Amendment
liberties that might be chilled by an adverse RICO judgment.'" He
expressly refused to provide examples of assertions that would prevail
as First Amendment defenses, except to enumerate a few cases
involving successful First Amendment claims. 45
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The decision in National Organization For Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler achieved the narrow goal the Court set out to accomplish:
to settle the discord between the circuits regarding whether a RICO
enterprise requires a pecuniary motive.'" However, in so doing,
140. Id. at 806-07.
141. Id. at 807 .
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Justice Souter cited specifically NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886, 917 (1982) (holding a state law against "malicious interference with
business" unconstitutional as "applied to a civil-rights boycott" of all-white busi-
nesses); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (dismissing,
because of First Amendment liberties protecting association, a court order requiring
the NAACP to produce its membership rolls under a law addressing out-of-state
corporations); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.
1991) (placing a more difficult pleading standard on a complaint based on conduct
possibly protected by the First Amendment).
146. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802 (1994).
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Scheidler might raise questions regarding RICO's constitutionality,
particularly in its civil applications. Also, RICO's breadth, which
the Court has declared for years, 147 could result in legislative mod-
ifications aimed at narrowing the blunderbuss, scattershot focus
RICO presently has.'4 It is probable, however, that Congress fully
intended such breadth for RICO and appreciates its applications as
a powerful weapon against any form of organized crime. 49
Scheidler possibly further opens the door for defendants to
advance a successful constitutional challenge to either limit RICO's
application as applied to their particular facts'50 or to find the law
unconstitutional on its face. 5' Justice Scalia frankly addressed that
possibility in his concurrence in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co. 
52
In a footnote appended to the Scheidler opinion itself, the
unanimous Court indicated that, although the economic motive should
not be included as a protection against a restraint of First Amendment
liberties, constitutional arguments could be made with regard to the
147. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985); see also
supra notes 92-95 (discussing Sedima).
148. The Court has previously indicated that such measures would be required
to limit the broadly written law because the function of the judicial branch is to
interpret, not to write, law. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
149. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 246-49 (discussing RICO's legislative history to
demonstrate that Congress did intend for RICO to be broad to increase RICO's
effectiveness as a legal tool).
RICO's value depends on the eye of the beholder. Some see RICO as a valuable
tool, particularly for the government. Others see RICO as an abusive and overly
broad weapon. In fact, RICO has been coined "the most controversial law of the
last quarter century." ABRAMS, supra note 16, at 7 (citing Flaherty, A RICO Crisis,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 3).
150. A defendant could challenge a RICO claim by raising any constitutional
challenge unique to that defendant's case. Justice Souter discussed the possibility
of this type of claim in his concurring opinion in Scheidler. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
at 806-07 (Souter, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 137-45.
151. Justice Scalia suggested the possibility of a void-for-vagueness challenge to
the pattern element in his concurrence in H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). However, most scholars and courts have uniformly rejected the pos-
sibility. For a colorful and creative article discussing why one commentator believes
that RICO is not unconstitutionally vague, see Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, "Mother
of Mercy-Is This the End of RICO?"--Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-
for-Vagueness Challenge to RICO 'Pattern', 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1106 (1990).
152. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring). For another opinion
on the vagueness of the pattern requirement in RICO, consider the following words
uttered by Robert Bork: "Certain aspects of law should be declared unconstitu-
tionally vague. What does the phrase 'pattern of racketeering' mean? Nobody
knows. Congress should repeal the damn thing and start over again." Ann R.
Dowd, The U.S. Legal System is Breaking Down, FORTUNE, Mar. 26, 1990, at
146.
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structure of RICO. 5 ' The Court declined to discuss the constitutional
challenges of the respondents and amici because they only raised
constitutional challenges concerning the specific actions of the res-
pondents, rather than questioning the construction of the law itself. 15 4
This commentary by the Court should lead to a new array of
constitutional assaults on RICO by creative civil and criminal defense
attorneys.'55
This should be especially true in the Eighth Circuit, where the
appellate court has consistently been hesitant to expand the purview
of RICO except at the express direction of the Supreme Court.
Because Scheidler feasibly calls the very definition of enterprise found
in United States v. Anderson 56 into question,'57 the resulting void
provides little direction to the courts for understanding the meaning
of "enterprise." Moreover, if the Anderson concept of the RICO
enterprise has been overruled by the Scheidler opinion, then perhaps
the requirement that an enterprise must have a distinct structure
153. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806 n.6. Many commentators have theorized that
the entire statute is not unconstitutional; a few have attempted to dichotomize the
two RICO applications (civil and criminal) by positing that only civil RICO is
unconstitutionally vague. See Christopher J. Moran, Comment, Is the "Darling"
in Danger? "Void for Vagueness"--The Constitutionality of the RICO Pattern
Requirement, 36 VLt. L. REv. 1697, 1754-55 & nn.339-42 (1991). Mr. Moran
observed that civil RICO arguably extends Congress's intent further and more
frequently than does criminal RICO, civil RICO may involve First Amendment
concerns (particularly post-Scheidler), and civil RICO requires only a preponderance
of the evidence burden of proof. Id.
154. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806 n.6.
155. What the Court meant by footnote 6 is difficult to determine. Perhaps the
note refers to Justice Scalia's concurrence regarding the vagueness of RICO. H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Because the statute could foreseeably prohibit actions protected under the First
Amendment as a result of the Scheidler decision, the principles underlying Justice
Scaiia's concurrence may be strengthened. Courts more often apply the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to statutes that infringe on constitutional liberties. Bauerschmidt,
supra note 151, at 1116-17. Also, if a statute infringes on First Amendment liberties,
then the overbreadth doctrine may apply. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 16.8 (3d ed. 1986). The overbreadth doctrine applies to legislation
written so broadly that, in addition to proscribing unprotected activities, it proscribes
constitutionally protected activities. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.8 (3d ed. 1986).
156. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981); see supra note 88 (containing the Anderson definition of "en-
terprise").
157. One court decided that the Scheidler decision overrules the Anderson def-
inition of "enterprise." United States v. King, 850 F. Supp. 750, 751-53 (C.D. I11.
1994). Following this reasoning the court then held that there is no need to show
an enterprise distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity in a criminal RICO
case. Id. at 752.
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apart from the pattern of racketeering activity has been dismissed
as well. 58
An interesting comparison can be made of the Scheidler opinion
and the opinion in Reves v. Ernst & Young.159 The opinions employ
virtually identical analyses, yet appear to result in two contrary
holdings. The Reves majority approved an Eighth Circuit decision
mandating the operation or management' 6 requirement many have
considered not plainly found in RICO's text.' 6 ' Scheidler, on the
other hand, dismissed the economic motive requirement, 62 which
was not expressly in RICO's language.
In Reves, the majority of seven 63 held that one must participate
in the operation or management of the enterprise in order to be
held liable under RICO. '61 The Court, with Justice Blackmun writing, 65
reached this holding by looking to the language of the statute,'6
consulting virtually the same dictionary 67 used in Scheidler, 6s finding
further support from the legislative history, and citing to the same
law review article 69 to which Justice Rehnquist cited in Scheidler. 70
The only significant difference in the reasoning was the outcome of
the Court's plain language determination.' 7'
158. King, 850 F. Supp. at 752.
159. 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
160. The operation or management requirement applies to the conducting element
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1166. The Reves Court found that
conduct includes an element of control, as in conducting an orchestra, and therefore,
to violate § 1962(c), one must be in the operation or management of the racketeering
enterprise. Id. at 1173.
161. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172.
162. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 798.
163. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1166. Two justices, Justice Souter joined by Justice
White, dissented. Id. at 1174 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the
Court misapplied its own textual analysis and the operation or management test
which the majority had approved. Id. at 1174-75. Justice Souter pointed out that
even if the "contextual" analysis was a close call, the liberal construction requirement
would break the tie against the more restrictive interpretation the majority utilized.
Id. at 1175.
164. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1170.
165. Id. at 1166.
166. Id. at 1169.
167. Id. at 1169 (citing WEBSTER'S THiD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 474
(1976)). In Scheidler, the Court employed the 1969 edition rather than the 1976
edition.
168. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
169. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1171 (citing Blakey, supra note 3, which is discussed
more fully supra notes 113-14).
170. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804 n.5.
171. Compare Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169-74 (accepting the operation or man-
agement requirement) with Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 803-06 (rejecting the commercial
motive requirement).
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Considering the two cases together seemingly lessens the real
impact of this case for civil RICO plaintiffs. The Court might find
any supportive lexicon by which to interpret the plain language of
the statute and could easily identify reinforcing legislative history to
support or refute any limiting element a lower court could apply
to the language of RICO.
The intriguing question whether this holding will affect many
protest groups such as the pro-life groups charged under RICO
engages the legal mind.17 1 If nonviolent protesters can be held ac-
countable under RICO, then possibly so could have the civil rights
activists and Vietnam War protesters of the sixties, the prohibitionists
of the early 1900s, and the abolitionists of the pre-Civil War era.
This result is worthy only of despair. Hopefully, and properly, the
statute will be found only applicable to violent protests. 73 The Court
has never found violence to be a protected liberty under the First
Amendment. 7 4 However, the application of RICO to nonviolent
protests, even protests which possibly harm the health care business,
172. One new development unique to the area of antiabortion protesting is the
passage of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE). Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994) (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248). Perhaps the holding in Scheidler will be of little
impact if FACE is found constitutional, because that statute's application will give
abortion clinics and women's rights groups ammunition against protesters.
The stated purpose of FACE follows:
[I]t is the purpose of this Act to protect and promote the public safety
and health and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing
Federal criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain violent, threatening,
obstructive and destructive conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate
or interfere with persons seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health
services.
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694,
694 (1994) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248).
The constitutionality of FACE will niost likely be challcngcd by antiabortion
groups, but the Court will likely weigh the First Amendment freedoms of the
protesters against the rights of the patients to receive available health care. See,
e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (affirming a
buffer zone injunction against antiabortion protesters around an abortion-providing
health center). Such a balancing of liberties should result in the finding that FACE
is constitutionally valid. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516. The Madsen court upheld
certain limitations on the pro-life protesters, but overturned others which impinge
further than necessary on First Amendment freedoms. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
The Court only upheld those limitations that it felt properly protect a legitimate
state interest in prohibiting unlawful conduct. Id.
173. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-15 (1982). The
Court stated that even speech which advocates violence is protected so long as the
speech does not give rise to imminent violence. Id. at 927. The opinion also held,
though, that violence is never protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 916.
174. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 916.
should not be tolerated. To employ any law against peaceful ex-
pressive activity should be deemed unconstitutional.'7 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The Scheidler Court principally held that no economic motive
requirement exists in RICO. The Court addressed that narrow issue
and no more. Scheidler gave little direction to lower courts and
provided no further definition regarding any of RICO's elements.
The questions lie in this silence. Regardless of the possibilities
that can be posited, however, the Court did expressly state that the
only thing the opinion accomplished was to find that RICO does
not require an economic motive. Because RICO provides law en-
forcement with a good weapon against organized crime, courts should
uphold the statute, but they also need to make stronger efforts to
more concretely define RICO's terms. Finally, any nonviolent protests
should be held free from prosecution under the RICO statute.
Bryan W. Riley
175. Even advocacy of violence is protected so long as the advocacy is not
directed to "inciting ... imminent lawless action" and will not "likely . . . produce
such [imminent lawless] action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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